The protection of trademarks, when it raises a conflict with the protection of geographical indications is one of the most contested issues on the international trade and intellectual property arena. In European Communities -Protection of Trademarks and Geographical Indications for Agricultural Products and Foodstuffs a WTO panel was faced with this issue. The panel report gives some insight into what international trademark law mandates as well as some pointers on how conflicts between different IP rights should be solved. This article attempts a deeper analysis of the coexistence of rights in the framework of the TRIPS Agreement that will inevitably grow in importance, when traderelated aspects start permeating all intellectual property issues in WTO fora. The article adopts a new approach to analyzing international trademark law. The Western concept of trademarks as property is contrasted to another concept of property that is derived from the use of property. While the property discussion in itself is not new to trademark law, nor is a discussion on the significance of trademark use in trademark law, here, the discussions are combined and refined in an attempt to provide an analytical framework for deciding international trademark cases.
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The article adopts a new approach to analyzing international trademark law. The Western concept of trademarks as property is contrasted to another concept of property that is derived from the use of property. While the property discussion in itself is not new to trademark law, nor is a discussion on the significance of trademark use in trademark law, here, the discussions are combined and refined in an attempt to provide an analytical framework for deciding international trademark cases.
It is argued that the property right in a trademark should be assessed through how it is used, and any finding of infringement hinges upon whether the use of the trademark by its proprietor is unlawfully affected by a third party's use of an identical or similar sign. Informed by property theory and international law, the analytical framework is applied to the issues raised in the panel report. This leads to the conclusion that the panel report is flawed in certain respects. While bringing new subject matter within the trade regime broadened the scope of international economic regulation, the enforcement mechanism established within the framework of the WTO also seemingly rendered international trade law more pervasive than ever in relation to its subjects. The protection of trademarks, when it is in conflict with the protection of GIs and vice versa is one of the most contested issues on the international trade and intellectual property arena. The GI-report gives some insight into what international trademark law mandates as well as some pointers on how conflicts between different IP rights should be solved. This article attempts a deeper analysis of the coexistence of rights in the framework of the TRIPS Agreement that will inevitably grow in importance, when traderelated aspects start permeating all IP issues in WTO fora.
As existing international trademark law has not evolved to fill the market regulatory function it serves on the national level, this article adopts a new approach to analyzing international trademark law. First, an analogy to different concepts of property, as revealed by three cases around the world highlights when and how trademarks can be viewed as property. The Western concept of trademarks as property (derived from possession) is then contrasted to another, namely Maori, concept of property that is derived from the use of property.
The property discussion in itself is not new to trademark law in the United States or the rest of the world nor is a discussion on the significance of trademark use 5 in trademark law. Here, however, the discussions are combined and refined in an attempt to provide an analytical framework for deciding international trademark cases. This article is not slightly different.) interpreting "this section" to mean that Article 24 (3) and (5) only apply in relation to section III and geographical indications. See infra footnote 163. 5 The meaning and purpose of the requirement of trademark use in contemporary trademark law is and has been widely debated in the United States as well as in Europe, due to a wide range of contradictory judicial decisions. Thus, they focus on the defendant's use. Although this article is very much concerned with the significance of trademark use to our understanding of trademark law, it is not intended as an addition to this discussion. In this article the right holder's trademark use is significant.
primarily concerned with the defendant's use of a sign as a trademark, nor on the proprietor's right to property. Instead this article argues that the property right in a trademark should be assessed through how it is used, and any finding of infringement hinges upon whether the use of the trademark by its proprietor is unlawfully affected by a third party's use of an identical or similar sign. The focus is neither on the proprietor nor on the mark itself, but on the protected use.
Second, the analytical framework is supported by an analysis of the international legal system and third, the analytical framework, informed by property theory and international law, is applied to the issues raised in the GI-report. This leads to the conclusion that the GI-report is flawed in certain respects.
Hence, this article argues that the text of the TRIPS Agreement, when infused by the general principles of public international law, although seemingly vague, provides a binding analytical framework for assessing the legitimate scope of trademark protection under international law. The existing analytical framework can be derived from three sources:
1) The minimum standard of protection set forth in the agreement (art. 16 (1));
2) the degree of derogation allowed from the afforded rights under art. 17 and;
3) the context and structure of the TRIPS Agreement. Oct. 12, 1998) . In this sense the specific provision and the issue it regulates constrains and guides interpretation on the more general levels. However, the general level provides a background and framework for choosing between alternative interpretations regarding the meaning of the terms used in a specific provision.
The analytical framework rests on a contextual 7 approach to interpretation of the TRIPS Agreement. Just as the meaning of each word in each provision rests not only on the ordinary meaning of the word, but also on the context in which it is used, the meaning of each provision should be ascertained in conjunction with the other provisions of the treaty. This article argues that an overly literal interpretation, with the effect of drawing arbitrary lines between different intellectual property rights (IPRs), is inconsistent with the TRIPS Agreement. How do different understandings of 7 According to its legal definition context refers to "the surrounding text of a word or passage, used to determine the meaning of that word or passage". Black's Law Dictionary 268 (Abridged 8 th ed. 2005). By contextual I however refer to something more than mere text; I also refer to the structure of the agreement. The Oxford English Dictionary 820-821 (2 nd ed., Vol III (1989) defines context as " the connected structure of a writing or composition" or "The whole structure of a connected passage regarded in its bearing upon any of the parts which constitute it; the parts which immediately precede or follow any particular passage or 'text' and determine its meaning." By "a contextual approach" I therefore refer to more than the literal text of the agreements, although the text itself remains the primary source. The text is also evidence of the fact that agreement was reached as well as the extent and scope of agreement, which like any agreement bears legal significance. The approach is premised on the intent of the parties to abide by the terms of the agreement. While the objective and purpose of the agreement can be indicative of a preferred interpretation (i.e. the interpretation that furthers the objective and purpose of the treaty should prevail over one that runs contrary to it), it cannot operate on its own to fill in gaps in the treaty. This is the primary difference to the teleological approach, at least as used by the European Court of Justice (See Paul Craig, Grainne de Burca, EU Law, Texts, Cases and Materials 98, (3 rd edition 2003)). Furthermore, the objective and purpose of the treaty is to be ascertained based on the complete text of the treaty as read according to the general principles of treaty interpretation, not based on the legislative history or any partisan source recollecting legislative intent. Albeit a line drawn in water, the contextual approach only travels back in time to ascertain how the "legislators" viewed the final draft of the treaty; what they objectively and collectively thought they had achieved, not what their individual objectives were in negotitating it. 8 WT/DS290/R, supra note 4, at 7.632: interpreting "this section" to mean that Art. 24 (3) and (5) only apply in relation to section III and geographical indications. 9 This article does not ask whether or not trademarks are property; it is the starting point of this article that they are. The GI-panel was faced with a complaint where a European Community regulation on protection of geographical indications (GIs) was alleged to encroach upon the minimum level of trademark protection mandated by the TRIPS Agreement.
Section IV approaches the TRIPS Agreement through the interpretive lens of general rules of international law and international trade law.
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According to customary international law, treaty provisions should on the one hand be narrowly interpreted, but on the other hand they should not be interpreted so as to render the provisions ineffectual.
Each provision of the treaty was intended to have effect and an interpretation giving some provisions more effect than others is thus inconsistent with the general objective and purpose of the treaty. Much like WTO panels should not act as an international legislature through activist interpretation, WTO panels should not stall progress through "passivist" interpretation; shying away in areas of political contention.
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Instead WTO the international arena requires a different remedy. This is because only common law countries traditionally provide for explicit defenses in the statutory text. In the civil law world (the vast majority of the Member States of the WTO), national trademark laws only include implicit reference to limitations of afforded rights in a trademark. Statutes that are seemingly heavily tilted in the proprietor's favor therefore require a more potent counterweight. Nevertheless, I argue that my solution; a new contextual approach to trademark law, applies equally to the United States and the common law world, where the same problems exist albeit to a lesser degree. 10 WT/DS290/R, supra note4. 11 Pauwelyn, supra note 3, at 25. 12 An overly formalistic and literal approach to a politically contested issue amounts to an attempt to hide behind the law that distorts rather than clarifies existing international law. panels should interpret the TRIPS Agreement and its provisions in the legal framework and practical context in which they operate. Absent express wording on the specific issue to the contrary a hierarchy of intellectual property rights should not be presumed to have been built into the TRIPS Agreement. The agreement itself, its mere adoption as well as its structure, supports a presumption of equality.
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In section V the analytical framework produced by this analysis is developed to define the scope and limits of what constitutes the minimum standard of trademark protection under international law. The article argues that the GI-panel's reading of the TRIPS Agreement is counterintuitive; it creates a hierarchy of IPRs that would require Member
States to restructure their protective schemes accordingly. It is further argued that the TRIPS Agreement -implicitly and explicitly -stands for a presumption of co-existence of rights and the provisions of the agreement should be interpreted accordingly.
Likewise, the TRIPS Agreement does not exist in a vacuum, which should be reflected in the interpretation of it. 17 That is, FNB contests the seizure of the cars in the first place (25(1)), and contends that the taking amounts to an expropriation for which they should be compensated (25(2)).
II
party.
18
Section 25 of the South African Constitution contains a negative guarantee of property rights in the form of protection against arbitrary deprivations. Although a large portion of section 25 concerns issues regarding real property it expressly states that property is not limited to land.
19
After extensive theoretical and comparative analysis of section 25 the court held the provision that authorized the sale was unconstitutional.
The court concluded, on the one hand, that the protection of property in the negative does not include an express guarantee of the right to acquire, hold and dispose of property.
20
On the other hand, the court acknowledged that a guarantee of the right to hold property (once lawfully acquired) is implicitly recognized by most democracies as falling within the negative right.
21
The same right extends to both natural and juristic persons;
22
it is however not absolute, but subject to limitation based on societal considerations.
23
In order to reflect this nature of the right, the approach to the interpretation of section 25 has to be contextual. In the words of the court " Arbitrariness should be evaluated in the legislative context to which the prohibition against "arbitrary" deprivation has to be applied as well as to the nature and extent of the deprivation.
28
More specifically it is to be determined by evaluating the relationship between the means employed and the ends sought as well as the relationship between the purpose for the deprivation and 1) the person whose property is affected, 2) the nature of the property and 3) the extent of the deprivation. A more compelling purpose needs to be established when the deprivation affects land as opposed to other property as well as when the deprivation embraces all the incidents of ownership as opposed to affecting only some rights in the bundle of rights. The existence of alternatives as such is not enough to render the contested legislation unjustified. The proper inquiry is whether the interference strikes "a fair balance between the demand of the public or general interest of the community and the requirements of the protection of the individual's fundamental rights." 35 Although a deprivation of property without compensation can be legitimate, the compensation terms set forth in the relevant legislation are material to the assessment of fairness, and ultimately the legitimacy of the deprivation. 36 The court stressed that unlike other property that is inherently subject to restriction, qualification or limitation, the petitioner's title to land was absolute. The mere fact that a law of general applicability was in effect at the time of acquisition did not inherently limit petitioner's property right. Whether a law of general applicability can ever do so depends on whether the law can be seen as qualifying or limiting the right, i.e. take effect, at the moment of acquisition rather than pending certain circumstances at some time in the future.
37
Due to the fact that petitioner had registered title to the land and the public interest therefore was weaker than in the case of unregistered property, the transfer of title to the possessors without compensation was greatly disproportionate to the total revocation of petitioner's property interest.
38
In the end the decision seemed to turn on the fact that the law did not require that the owner be given notice during the 12-year time-period. Anheuser-Busch argued that the enjoyment of a property right afforded at the time of application could not be disturbed absent specific law to this point.
43
A Czech holder of a GI had successfully opposed the trademark application in extensive opposition proceedings. 44 Consequently, the trademark registration never issued.
The court concluded that a conditional right can be subject to non-realization if it conflicts with the rights of third parties, provided that legislation to this effect is clear and precise at the time of acquisition of the right. 45 The mere fact that some protection is afforded (a right of priority) from the time of application does not necessarily mean that the property interest involved is absolute. 46 The dissenting judges placed weight on the great economic value of the right conferred by trademark applications 47 in contemporary society and recognized a protected property interest. They seemed inclined to view trademark law in general as wholly unsatisfactory in the modern world, since they concluded that a result that renders a valuable asset unexploitable in some markets amounts to interference with the peaceful enjoyment of one's possessions. 48 The dissenters therefore concluded that the Portuguese legislation failed to strike a fair balance between the public interest sought and the individual property interest. 49 In contrast, the Maori system is premised on a theory of property allocation that hinges not on the owner or object of the property; in fact these aspects are irrelevant for the purposes of determining the scope of the right. Before being replaced by the British property system all land was communally owned and the community granted individual members of the community multiple usufructuary rights. 51 Instead of obtaining a piece of 46 Anheuser-Busch Inc. v. Portugal, supra note 41, at § 47 and 52. 47 Namely the exclusive right to use the mark for named products in a certain geographic area. 48 Anheuser Busch v. Portugal, supra note 41, Joint dissenting opinion of judges Costa and Cabral Barreto at § 5: "Although in the present case the applicant company cannot really be said to have been deprived of ownership of the "Budweiser" mark, as there was no formal or constructive expropriation, it is nevertheless undeniable that the effect of the decisions of the domestic courts has been to prevent the applicant company from using the mark in Portugal. Its total inability to exploit the mark commercially constitutes interference. Such interference must comply with the rule of law, pursue a legitimate aim and strike a "fair balance" between the demands of the general interest of the community and the requirements of the protection of the individual's fundamental rights (Iatridis v. Greece [GC] land and all rights to it, the Maori had rights to hunt, rights to cultivate land and rights to pick berries. 52 The community owned the geographical space, which allocated and enforced the usufructuary rights as well as enforced its rights against other communities.
53
Several members thus could hold rights in the same geographical space, but they were different rights that did not encroach upon each other. 54 Members were encouraged to exercise their rights to their fullest extent without harming others, which put all land to its most efficient use to service the needs of the community. Dressed in trademark terms, as long as the trademark is used to indicate the origin of goods or services, the owner of the mark is irrelevant for the question of ascertaining whether the mark is protected or not. In other words the property right is alienable as long as its function in the overall system of allocation is not altered. The question is purely whether the use is legitimate in relation to the interests of third parties. The right exists as long as and to the extent it is used according to the initial allocation. 56 Some pushing of boundaries may occur and is actually desirable in order to maximize the use of all resources. 57 In the event of a conflict whoever furnishes proof of a legitimate interest in continued use of the disputed subject matter will prevail. Regardless of the outcome of the dispute, the rights are presumed to coexist to the extent that they do not conflict with 52 Although the current system is arguably based upon similar logic the contemporary emphasis on individual property rights has clearly overshadowed this premise of trademark law. 60 In sum, all of the decisions referenced above treat property in land differently than other property interests and are more likely to view the property right in land as one of absolute ownership. By the same token not all deprivations of land are illegitimate, since only some trigger the duty of compensation. Hence, absolute ownership does not literally mean that the rights of the owner are absolute, i.e. not routinely subordinate to the public interest. 61 Consequently, while some rights can be taken away, some rights were never given in the first place.
62
All property rights are thus inherently subject to internal as well as external limitations.
In comparison a mobile phone consists of patented hardware, copy-righted software, a protected design and is marketed under a protected trademark. All these rights exist apart from the property right in the mobile phone itself. This solution caters to needs of the contemporary dynamic community. Likewise, the Maori system optimally served the needs of their community, because the same geographic area can not be hunted, grazed or 58 Pending certain circumstances that are specifically set forth in legislation e.g. abandonment, failure to renew registration etc. 59 After all, it is the government not the individual rights holder that enforces the use rights of the individual against encroachment from others. See Banner, supra note , 813-814. 60 cultivated indefinitely or it will be drained. Similarly yet differently, trademark owners need to constantly develop their trademarks to fit their products and business. The extent of the actual use therefore rarely completely coincides with the mark that is registered at any given time. However, the option of fixing the right to a physical object is not available in trademark law. While the English system that replaced the Maori system was arguably more efficient, the same system encounters its weaknesses in relation to IPRs.
The physical connection distorts rather than aids the attainment of allocative efficiency and forces the IPR-system to race between the extremes of insufficient protection of third parties to insufficient protection of rights holders. A theory of allocation that focuses on use instead of the owner or object of property rights will allow for a near optimal allocation of rights on both sides, since it is inherently flexible to the needs of the users as well as the community.
63
In other words a balance is continuously struck between competing interests both when allocating rights and in resolving conflicts of rights.
What purpose then does the two step deprivation analysis set forth in the South African case serve in treaty interpretation? Professor Joost Pauwelyn categorizes conflicts that arise in treaty interpretation as false conflicts, true apparent conflicts and genuine conflicts. 64 In matters of international trademark law a false conflict might arise when trademark rights are impacted by legislation, however, careful scrutiny reveals that the trademark owner does not have a legitimate property interest in the subject matter that has allegedly been deprived. The majority in Anheuser-Busch v. Portugal reached this 63 Compare to Lemley, supra note 60, at 1031, 1071 and 1074. 64 Pauwelyn, supra note 3, at 244. Pauwelyn focuses on issues of public international law and consequently refers to conflicts between treaties or different provisions of one or more treaties. Although the subject matter of trademark or intellectual property law can be viewed as falling into the category of private international law, treaty interpretation follows the rules of public international law, regardless of the subject matter covered by the conflicting provisions. The rules of public international law determine the extent of obligations of a sovereign nation under international law. In one sense a property right is a right against the world, since it confers enforceable rights to something on the owner. On the other hand, the contents of the rights in the bundle, differs depending on whom it is asserted against based on the duties of ownership conferred on the owner in the initial 65 For purposes of decision-making in the meantime four solutions are available: 1) the agreements contain explicit conflicts clauses; 2) the newer agreement governs (lex posterior); 3) the specialized rule governs (lex specialis) or; 4) the aggrieved party is compensated. For further elaboration see Pauwelyn, supra note 3, at 489. 66 Waldron, supra note 14, at 27.
allocation.
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Neither is the bundle of rights static or constant in effect or character, since the right itself confers the right on the owner to change the relationship. In this sense the property right is defined by contracts between the owner and others. 68 However, there are some "inherent defects" in all titles that the owner does not have the power to correct. We focus on those next.
The property right is necessarily defined by its object. Unlike a plot of land or physical object, defining the object of intellectual property rights is however notoriously difficult.
69
Most other intangible interests can at least conceptually be tied to some tangible form of property, which in turn the right can be contrasted against. A bank holds a mortgage on a house only insofar the debt has not been paid and a shareholder's interest is defined by the existence and success of the company as well as the interests of other shareholders. No one (generally) has a property right in the subject matter from which a trademark is created; it is taken from the pool of collective resources. At the same time the object of the right is distinct from the property right in the paper it is printed on, the web-site that displays it, or the goods to which it is affixed. Any attempt to contrast it to a tangible resource leads to a misleading result, since they are not connected in the traditional property law sense.
70
Another traditional approach to defining a property right when the resource is taken out of the common pool is through possession.
71
A land owner gained ownership through 67 Waldron, supra note 14, at 27. 68 When an owner exercises his right to sell or lease the property he automatically restricts his own right to use the property and exclude others from using it in relation to the contracting party on the terms set forth in their agreement. marking the boundaries of his plot of land and claimed ownership to wild horses by capturing them and fencing them in. The trademark owner claims a similar right when initially using the mark in commerce, and if no one else is using the same mark on the same goods it is quite easy for the public to accept the capture of a specific "plot" on the market. 72 However, much like the neighbor is likely to object when a landowner tries to expand the boundaries of his property, or the community, when one family captures all the horses, problems arise when the trademark owner adopts an expansive interpretation of the right to exclude others. If these conflicts were decided by whoever has possession, the "encroacher" would naturally have the upper hand. 73 However, in a society with scarce resources these conflicts are generally decided by scrutinizing the original allocation of property rights for inherent defects in title.
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In other words the trademark right is defined, by weighing it against the public interest against allocating any right (to the contested subject matter) to begin with. The object of contention is thus separate from the initial allocation and does not affect the original grant. In this sense each infringement action turns on whether or not the trademark owner 72 Although some countries afford trademark protection solely based on use others base entitlement on registration. Even so registration-based countries generally require that the mark be used in commerce although the registration serves as notice on third parties. In used based countries, 'visible' presence on the market is vital, since protection is afforded only insofar third parties are aware of the use (i.e. have received notice). 73 The landowner will have visibly staked a claim to the neighbor's land and the horses are no longer wild, but in the hunter's possession. Likewise the trademark owner is the only entity that is visibly present on the plot on the market and has probably sought to visibly assert its right (through advertising) to the market on which infringement is claimed to occur. The claim is similar to the case on adverse possession. Under what circumstances may the rightful owner be deprived of his or her property due to passivity? 74 Locke's theory on allocation confers a property right to what one mixes one's labor with. The theory however contains a caveat; it presumes that it is immoral to take too much. Locke however does not further explore into a world of conflicting property rights. John Locke: Two Treatises of Government, 285-286, 302 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1988) (1690).
has a legitimate expectation in the property interest sought. After all a property right only has value if it can be enforced against others. 75 Legitimacy is derived from the initial grant as set forth by trademark legislation. Article 16.1 of THE TRIPS AGREEMENT affords the trademark owner the following rights:
"The owner of a registered trademark shall have the exclusive right to prevent all third parties not having the owner's consent from using in the course of trade identical or similar signs for goods or services which are identical or similar to those in respect of which the trademark is registered where such use would result in a likelihood of confusion. In case of the use of an identical sign for identical goods or services, a likelihood of confusion shall be presumed. The rights described above shall not prejudice any existing prior rights, nor shall they affect the possibility of Members making rights available on the basis of use."
The international minimum standard of trademark protection only applies to registered 75 Property is a legal fiction and does not exist without a legal system that enforces it. See Demsetz, supra note 57, at 347. Ownership has no value, if anyone can take the object of ownership from its owner or the owner has no conceivable means of enforcing his right. For example there are millions of "owners" of land on the moon (see e.g. www.lunarlandowner.com). However, when push comes to shove and space travel does allow people to occupy the moon, these certificates will arguably be worthless, because no legal system is likely to recognize them and enforce the rights of the owners against others (including governments). In this sense only governments can allocate rights to new property or by recognizing a previous allocation activate legal enforcement mechanisms in support of the recognition. The latter option is generally invoked after periods of war or occupation, when property is returned to its original owners. 76 A mark that has become well-known through extended use (after registration) is awarded extended protection in article 16(3) of the TRIPS Agreement, supra note 1, which by crossreference incorporates article 6 bis of the Paris Convention. Our inquiry concerns the scope of rights conferred on the owner by way of registration and is thus different from the scope of protection of well-known marks, whose captured plot on the market in certain circumstances has been allowed to expand over time by way of legislative approval. 77 Article 16(2) of the TRIPS Agreement, supra note 1, extends the same protection to services.
In addition to affording a limited right the TRIPS Agreement acknowledges that the trademark right confers certain rights and duties on the trademark owner. Member States may impose a requirement of use (and most do) and renewal in order to maintain the registration, but a trademark registration shall (in principle) be renewable indefinitely. 78 The use of a trademark shall not be unjustifiably burdened with special requirements, nor can it ever be subject to a compulsory license. 78 Article 18-19 of the TRIPS Agreement, supra note 1. 79 Article 20-21 of the TRIPS Agreement, supra note 1. 80 Article 21 of the TRIPS Agreement, supra note 1. 81 Nonetheless evidence may be transmitted in rebuttal.
The logic of this analytical structure operates with a twist on the international level.
Under the TRIPS Agreement Member States are only mandated to provide minimum protection to trademark owners, unless the principles of national treatment or most favored nation are violated.
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Hence, additional protection is not mandated but a choice which in turn can trigger certain duties, namely that of equal treatment. The paramount question of law (when considering the arbitrariness of the deprivation) remains whether or not the Member State is in violation of its international obligation to provide a minimum standard of protection for trademarks.
As was the question in the property cases above, the inquiry includes two steps: 1) is a legitimate property interest at stake and 2) is the deprivation arbitrary or illegitimate?
Article 17 of the TRIPS Agreement reads as follows:
"Members may provide limited exceptions to the rights conferred by a trademark, such as fair use of descriptive terms, provided that such exceptions take account of the legitimate interests of the trademark owner and of third parties."
Hence, the exclusive right afforded in Article 16(1), can be subject to limited exceptions.
In other words, in a situation where all four elements of article 16 (1) are satisfied; a mark is used in commerce on identical or similar goods in a way that causes a likelihood of confusion, the use may nonetheless be lawful.
82 Articles 3 and 4 of the TRIPS Agreement, supra note 1. The EC legislation confers an implied right to use a GI in relation to the relevant products upon registration. 
III.B European Communities-Protection of Trademarks and Geographical Indications for Agricultural Products and Foodstuffs

III.B.1 Does Article 24 of the TRIPS Agreement Provide an Exception to Trademark
91
The GI-Panel concluded that they refuse to adopt an approach to treaty interpretation, which is not supported by the ordinary meaning of its terms in their context.
92
88 WT/DS290/R, supra note 4, at 7.624. 89 WT/DS290/R, supra note 4, at 7.618 90 WT/DS290/R, supra note 4, at 7.625. 91 WT/DS290/R, supra note 4, at 7.606, 7.611 and 7.632. 92 WT/DS290/R, supra note 4, at 7.624.
III B.2 Exceptions Under Article 17 of the TRIPS Agreement
When turning to Article 17 the GI-panel recognized two elements that the national legislation must satisfy: 1) the exceptions must be limited and 2) must take account of the legitimate interests of the owner of the trademark and of third parties. Any interpretation of either element that excludes the example "fair use of descriptive terms" is necessarily incorrect.
93
The GI-panel noted that it can be instructive to refer to the interpretation by two previous panels on the interpretation of corresponding articles regarding exceptions to copyrights and patents. In ascertaining the meaning of the term "limited exceptions" the GI-panel concluded that the issue is whether the exception to the rights conferred by a trademark is narrow.
96
Exceptions may apply to 1) a category of third parties; with respect to 2) the identity or similarity of the marks or goods; 3) the degree of likelihood of confusion; 4) a 93 WT/DS290/R, supra note 4, at 7.648. 94 Exceptions to copyrights are regulated in Article 13 of the TRIPS Agreement, supra note 1, and was interpreted in . 95 WT/DS290/R, supra note 4, at 7.649. 96 WT/DS290/R, supra note 4, at 7.650; Citing Canada-Pharmaceutical Patents, supra note 94, at para 7.30 and expressly noting that relevant inquiry focuses on exceptions to the rights conferred, not to a set of trademarks or trademark owners. Likewise the GI regulation recognizes a ground for refusal of registration based on an earlier trademark hence the trademark owner's right to exclude confusing uses is not completely diminished even against the GI applicant.
III.B. 3. Legitimate interests
Following a contextual approach the GI-panel concluded that the legitimate interests of the trademark owner must be something different from the full enjoyment of the rights conferred by a trademark. Likewise the legitimate interests of third parties must be something more than simple enjoyment of their legal rights.
103
Citing CanadaPharmaceuticals Patents the GI-panel concluded that the provision calls "for protection of interests that are 'justifiable' in the sense that they are supported by relevant public policies and other social norms".
104
The GI-panel referred to "the WTO Members' shared understandings of the policies and norms relevant to trademarks", when concluding that the protected function of trademarks is the ability to distinguish goods and services from those of other companies in the course of trade.
105
While it is in the legitimate interest of the trademark owner to receive protection of the source identifying function of its trademark, protection is not absolute.
106
In contrast to Articles 13, 26.2 and 30 that refer to "unreasonable prejudice", Article 17 requires only that exceptions "take account" of the legitimate interests of the owner. According to the GI-panel the chosen wording hence suggests that less protection is required for the legitimate interests of the trademark owner.
107
This reading also corresponds with the absence of specific reference to the rights of third parties in Articles 13, 26.2 and 30.
103 WT/DS290/R, supra note 4, at 7.662. 104 WT/DS290/R, supra note 4, at 7.663 citing Canada-Pharmaceutical Patents, supra note 94, at para. 7.69. 105 WT/DS290/R, supra note 4, at 7.664. 106 WT/DS290/R, supra note 4, at 7.670. 107 WT/DS290/R, supra note 4, at 7.671.
The GI-panel further notes that the relevant third parties for the purposes of Article 17 include both consumers and persons using a geographical indication. Article 1 Nature and Scope of Obligations "1. Members shall give effect to the provisions of this Agreement. Members may, but shall not be obliged to, implement in their law more extensive protection than is required by this Agreement, provided that such protection does not contravene the provisions of this Agreement. Members shall be free to determine the appropriate method of implementing the provisions of this Agreement within their own legal system and practice."
Adopting minimum standards of protection follows the traditional format of international agreements, after all it is notoriously difficult to reach consensus on an adequate level of protection between more than 150 different legal systems and maintain a level that has any practical effect.
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In addition, great deference is shown to the Member States in implementing the provisions of the treaty both relating to means chosen as well as to the level of protection in practice, provided that it is higher than the minimum level of protection. Customary rules of public international law mandate that "a treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its objective and purpose". is only allowed when the contextual interpretation leaves the meaning ambiguous or leads to a manifestly absurd or unreasonable result. The main concern in this section is to ascertain the binding force or effect of a Panel ruling as a contribution to the body of international trade law.
128
According to the DSU the purpose of the dispute settlement system and hence the rulings set forth by it is to provide "security and predictability to the multilateral trading system".
129
Much like any other decision-making body in a rule-oriented (as opposed to policy-based) system, the WTO system cannot be successful unless three goals are met: The system must be viewed by the Member States as 1) just, 2) credible as well as 3) efficient. Furthermore, maintaining the multilateral trading system is not a right or obligation per se, instead each provision should be reviewed in light of the object and purpose of the provision itself. Thus, generally testing a measure for consistency with the object and purpose of the treaty exceeds the jurisdiction of panels. 142 Nevertheless, the result of the interpretative approach must lead to a test or standard that is justifiable under the agreement. 143 Consequently, absent express wording on point, terms of the treaty must nonetheless be read in light of contemporary concerns among the Member States as expressed, e.g., in the preamble of the agreement. 144 Finally, the Appellate Body has expressly stated that Member States "should not be assumed…to have continued previous protection or discrimination through the adoption of a new measure", since this would amount to a presumption of bad faith that is inconsistent with the general nature of international law. 145 However, the policy goal of a measure, no matter how noble, cannot provide its justification, if it does not meet the general requirements for an exemption. 146 Total deference to Member States cannot ensure an objective assessment under Article 3.2 of the DSU. 147 In any search for a meaning of a treaty, treaty interpretation should be seen as a tool for conflict avoidance. 148 As mentioned above, conflicts can generally be categorized as false conflicts, true apparent conflicts and genuine conflicts. Despite the adopted contextual approach, the GI-panel arguably treated Article 17 as well as the TRIPS Agreement itself as only including a static dimension; i.e. a fixed allocation of rights and duties. The GI-panel took the standard of protection expressed in the TRIPS Agreement as the starting point for its analysis when evaluating whether the exceptions were limited and whether the interests of the parties were legitimate. Hence, the limited scope of the exception was ascertained by contrasting it to the international minimum standard of protection; and the legitimacy of interests of third parties was ascertained by equating the interest to the international minimum standard of protection and subjecting it to the provisio of Article 17.
Member States are however entitled as well as encouraged to grant more protection for IPRs than the international minimum standard set forth in the TRIPS Agreement.
160
Most
Western nations do, and the Member States of the European Community grant higher levels of protection to both trademarks and GIs than mandated by the TRIPS Agreement.
159 According to the GI-Panel's reading of Article 24 this issue is and is not governed by international obligations. The TRIPS Agreement mandates protection of trademarks and of GIs but only insofar as the latter does not encroach on the exercise of the former. The GI-Panel thus created a hierarchy of IPRs and seemed to treat the issue of compliance as one of fact not of law, when concluding that the EC regulation did not impact the exercise of trademark rights so as to render the exception too broad to qualify under Article 17. The Panel should as a matter of law (compare to Article 1.1) have shown deference to the Member State and started from the factual presumption that the measure at least in part was mandated by Article 24 of TRIPS. After all, the European Community had not previously offered any GI protection. It is at least questionable, whether the GI-Panel had jurisdiction to interpret the TRIPS Agreement so as to alter the delicate balance struck in the negotiations that led to TRIPS. Under international law genuine conflicts cannot be solved by way of interpretation. Pauwelyn, supra note 3, at 272. 160 Article 1.1 of the TRIPS Agreement, supra note 1. Even regarding GI protection the TRIPS Agreement can hardly objectively be read as having concluded that e.g. France and Italy agreed to lower their existing GI protection based on their obligation under Article 16 (1).
In other words, while the TRIPS Agreement mandates that Member States afford some level of protection for trademarks as well as GIs, an e contrario conclusion is not permissible under international law: the TRIPS Agreement does not mandate protection only to the extent afforded by its provisions.
The GI-panel treated the minimum standard of protection afforded to GIs under the TRIPS Agreement as a 'ceiling' in the sense that it only recognized these interests as legitimate, and analytically subordinated these interests to those of trademark owners by viewing minimum GI protection as an exception. Regardless of emphasis to the contrary the GI-panel, as panels before it had done regarding copyright and patents, used a standard similar to viewing third party use as interfering with "normal exploitation" or creating "unreasonable prejudice" to the interests of the trademark owner. However, Article 17 explicitly shows deference to national legislatures to strike a fair balance between competing equal interests. The theory of allocation of trademark rights based on a use-based property system explains the relationships between rights embedded in the TRIPS Agreement. Keeping in mind the necessary link between property rights' allocation and enforcement it is inevitable that only governments can allocate trademark rights for their respective territories.
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It is within national jurisdiction to strike the final balance between the rights of trademark owners and third parties, since genuine conflicts can only be solved 161 See also Article 1.2 of the TRIPS Agreement, supra note 1. 162 Compare to Lemley, supra note 60, at 1072.
internationally by consensus, i.e. treaty amendment. In striking this balance international law mandates that some, not absolute, protection be given to IPRs.
On the other hand, international law is the flip side of national law; obligations are allocated instead of rights. Contrary to the findings of the GI-panel, it therefore naturally follows that the coexistence of all obligations is the norm. 
